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JUDGE RAGGI: Good morning.
Everyone knows that we are here this morning for what is an important
part of the work of the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on the Federal Rules.
Just to give you a little background on that work, the federal courts,
obviously, are engaged in the public’s business, and so the presumption is
that our work, including our files, are open to the public. There are many
reasons informing that presumption. Open files are important to the
litigants who are involved in the cases before us. Open files are important
to the public’s oversight of the courts’ work. Public access is also
important to history. There is much that can be learned about a society
from the work of its courts; from the concerns that prompt individuals to
seek assistance in the courts.
All of these reasons have led the judiciary to presume that our files would
be open. But increasingly, there have been concerns voiced about
unnecessary disclosures of private information in court files. Some of these
are not new. There has always been a concern about information disclosed
in court files that could actually facilitate other criminal conduct.
Identification information, such as Social Security numbers, that could be
used as part of identity theft or information about individuals cooperating
with government investigations, who, because they are helping to target
individuals involved in crimes, could find themselves targeted by criminals.
There has also been a general concern about whether a high loss of
privacy for litigants in the court will prompt people not to use the courts as
a means of resolving their disputes. As history teaches us, a society where
people do not think they can resolve their disputes in a court is a society
where they find some other means to do so, not always positive. So we face
these competing concerns of public access and protection of privacy.
The Federal Rules already provide for protection of privacy in many
respects. And those are relatively recent rules. Nevertheless, the last
decade’s experience with greater public access on the Internet to court files
has sharpened our understanding of privacy concerns. So in 2009 or
thereabouts, the chairman of the Standing Committee on the Federal Rules,
Lee Rosenthal, who I am so pleased is here with us today, started to receive
inquiries from members of Congress that seemed to deal with both of the
matters I have addressed: public access to the court. Congress is concerned
about whether we are going online fast enough and whether our access is
broad enough to serve the public. At the same time, Judge Rosenthal has
received congressional inquiries about why we are not doing more to
protect private material in these publicly available documents.
So in the best traditions of all bureaucracies, a subcommittee was formed
to study this matter. This subcommittee is, of course, the one that is here
today at Fordham.
We operate as a subcommittee of the Standing Committee on the Federal
Rules, but I really have to say that our efforts represent a joint endeavor by
both the Standing Committee and the Committee on Court Administration

2010]

PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS

3

and Court Management, CACM. They, of course, have responsibility for
policy, and the Standing Committee has responsibility for implementation.
I want to say thank you very much to all of my colleagues from CACM for
helping us, and most particularly, to the former chairman of that committee,
Judge Tunheim, who I am also pleased was able to join us today.
Most of you are here to serve on panels. I want to explain to you how we
view your contribution in the overall work of the subcommittee. We broke
our work down into two phases. The first I will call statistical. Through the
work of the Administrative Office and the Judicial Center, we have been
able to crunch lots and lots of numbers to get an idea of what is publicly
available, what kind of private information is showing up in court files, and,
just from a statistical perspective, how large a problem we have and in what
areas.
With the benefit of that information, we are now moving to phase two,
which is this conference. The subcommittee decided that it would be most
helpful to have the viewpoints of as many different persons in the legal and
related-to-law communities about public access and private information.
So we have invited you today, civil and criminal lawyers, prosecutors and
defense attorneys, academics, judges, and a variety of people who serve the
court—who serve the court as clerks of court and in various other support
functions—to come and talk to us about your experiences in these areas. I
thank you so much, on behalf of the subcommittee, for giving us your time.
And I want to remind you of what would be most helpful to us. You are
here to educate the committee. Please be frank about what you have seen
and where you identify concerns, and do not hesitate to disagree with your
fellow panelists. I cannot emphasize enough our view that we need to hear
diverse views on how to calibrate the balance between public access and
protection of privacy.
All of this effort this morning is the work of one person, and that is the
subcommittee reporter, Daniel Capra, Professor of Law here at Fordham. I
thank Dan many, many times for his work for this committee. He also
serves, in his spare time, as a reporter for the Evidence Committee and a
variety of other tasks. As everyone says, he is a dynamo, and most
particularly in the service to the judiciary. So thank you, Dan.
Of course, I also want to thank Fordham University for hosting this and
for really giving a lot of thought to what the conference should involve.
With that by way of welcome and introduction, let me turn it over to Dan
Capra.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Judge. Thank you very much for that
excellent introduction, which sets forth basically what we are trying to do
today.
I am moderating a panel which we have called the general panel. The
subcommittee is considering at least possible changes to the privacy rules.
The privacy rules are located in your materials, actually in a couple of
places. There were some pamphlets that were given out by the
Administrative Office, and behind Joe Cecil’s report is the particular
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privacy rules that were enacted in 2005, 5.2 of the Civil Rules, 49.1 of the
Criminal Rules, and the like.
The subcommittee, as I say, is considering whether rule amendments are
necessary and also is considering a discussion of policy changes, but all
within the context of this broader idea that Judge Raggi was talking about:
the balance between privacy on the one hand, and open access to court
records on the other, in the light of ease of Internet access. So we thought it
would be appropriate to kind of set the day with a general panel. By
“general,” it does not mean airy and platonic and talking about love and
things like that. There will be practical discussions involved as well, but
within the context of setting a broader framework.
I need to give my own thanks. First of all, I need to give my thanks to
Joe Cecil for all his fine work in terms of the statistics that he has done and
all the searches of the records that he has done over the past month. It has
been truly amazing. He will talk about that later on today, but since I have
the opportunity, I wanted to thank him for his excellent work in that respect.
I want to thank Susan Del Monte, who gave me many great
recommendations about who to call and who to bring here, especially for
the Plea Agreements Panel. I think we have a Plea Agreements Panel that
represents all the views that all the districts have been coming up with. I
would like to thank Susan for giving me those suggestions.
Allyson Haynes, from the University of Charleston School of Law, I
would like to thank because Charleston did a program that covered some of
these issues, and she was very helpful in helping me to form ideas for this
program.
With that, I am done. I would like to give you over to my colleague, who
I am proud to have here on the panel, Professor Joel Reidenberg, Professor
of Law at Fordham Law School and Director of the Center on Law and
Information Privacy.
PROF. REIDENBERG: Thank you, Dan, thank you, judges. I think it is
terrific that you are focusing so carefully on these issues.
My background is as a privacy scholar, not as a civil procedure expert.
So my remarks will be focused on some of the broader privacy issues that
open access raises.
To set the stage, I would like to focus on a few of the problems
associated with too much transparency. We do not often think about
publicly held information as giving us too much transparency in our
society. But to follow up on some of the comments that Judge Raggi made
just a few minutes ago, in the past, when we thought about the openness of
public records and particularly about court records that were open to the
public, we would find that those records still had an effective privacy
protection through practical obscurity. Access to the information was not
easy and physical or geographical limitations restricted how widely
information in the public records could actually be disseminated or
obtained. This made public record information practically obscure.
The Internet and network information flows eliminate that practical
obscurity today. We now live in a context with an increasingly and
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completely transparent citizen that has, I think, some very significant
dimensions. I would like to focus on two points during this short
presentation and make a suggestion for a way of approaching the tradeoff
between openness and privacy.
The first point is that completely open access has important public safety
implications. The Amy Boyer case illustrates this problem. Amy Boyer
lived in New Hampshire and was murdered by an ex-boyfriend who,
through access to information obtained from an information broker, found
out where she lived and worked, stalked her, and shot her at her workplace.7
That same kind of data, locational data, can now easily be gleaned from
publicly available court records, if they are online and searchable, and used
just as Boyer’s ex-boyfriend used the same data obtained from the
information broker. That is one obvious problem.
The less obvious, but very difficult, problem is the de-contextual use of
information that would be contained in court filings and court decisions. If
information about individuals is extracted from court filings and exploited
through data mining or combined with additional information acquired from
data brokers, from other public databases or from other publicly available
information, the original context is lost and the data mining leads to the
development of behavior profiles of individuals, to stereotyping, and to
decisions based on what I will call “secretive data processing” because the
data mining and profiling is hidden from the individuals. In effect, by
making all this information about the citizen so transparent, the public does
not really know what happens to their personal information and, ironically,
the accuracy of the information describing individuals can be compromised
through out-of-context compilations and profiling.
Another obvious consequence of the transparency of personal
information is identity theft. The richness of data that is in court filings
would be very useful for identity thieves. A criminal can very easily
masquerade as someone else if data can be taken from varied sources and
combined together to provide enough personal information about the
victim.
The second point is that the integrity of the judicial system is challenged.
This goes back to the comments that were made earlier in today’s session.
Unprecedented wide access and dissemination of everyday court records
and proceedings can have an impact on jurors’ willingness to serve and on
witness candor. If the personal cost for engaging with the legal system is a
perceived loss of privacy because the data is now publicly accessible, freely
searchable, and “Google-able” on the Web, the public hesitates or opposes
participation in the judicial system. Similarly, parties may be intimidated
by the Internet accessibility of personal information related to their
participation in a court proceeding. There is a qualitative difference from
the days when an observer had to go to a musty courthouse to find the data.
People will be reluctant to come to court to vindicate their rights if they
perceive that it makes their lives a completely open book.
7. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (N.H. 2003).
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Lastly, the transparency has an impact on perceptions of judicial
integrity. The data mining that might go on with respect to litigants,
witnesses, or statements made in a court filing can just as easily occur with
respect to the judges themselves and the judges’ personal lives. Many
would be surprised at the associations about judges that might be made by
data mining information in court cases just from the way judges manage
their cases. So these issues suggest that public safety and the integrity of
the judicial system are at risk from over-transparency.
As to my suggestion, I would like to focus on the approach to the tradeoff between openness and privacy. I know that court systems have focused
very carefully on redaction as one potential solution. The redaction model
is also used outside the United States, in many foreign jurisdictions, as a
way of balancing privacy interests with court oversight. But another model
that I would like to recommend as a very worthwhile avenue for the courts
to explore is limited-purposes disclosures. This approach makes personal
information available publicly, but only for defined purposes. We see this
approach in American legislation, specifically the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act.8 Under the Act, driver’s license information is a public
record, but the data cannot be used for purposes other than those
enumerated in the statute. The permissible purposes relate to the reasons
why the data is public information such as driver authentication, car
insurance, recalls, that sort of thing.
I think we need to explore this approach in the court context. The court
system should be addressing key questions. Why is the information about
these individuals publicly available? What is the reason for the information
to be publicly available? What are we trying to accomplish? Can we
construct limits on use in ways that are compatible with the public purpose
for the information being out there?
I will close with that.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Joel.
I turn now to Ron Hedges, former Magistrate Judge for the District of
New Jersey. He worked very hard to get the Sedona Conference to come
up with principles on privacy and public access to courts in a civil context.
I will also put in a plug that he is an excellent Special Master in the matter
of In re REFCO.9
MR. HEDGES: As are you.
PROF. CAPRA: I do not know about excellent, but I am as well. Over
to Ron.
MR. HEDGES: Good morning. Thank you for allowing me to be here.
I want to spend a few minutes talking with you about how The Sedona

8. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006).
9. In re REFCO Sec. Litig., No. 07 MDL 1902(JSR), 2010 WL 304966 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
21, 2010).
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Conference10 [Sedona] came up with its Best Practices on Public Access
and Confidentiality in Civil Litigation.
Sedona works through “Working Groups.” The Best Practices were a
product of Working Group 2 [WG2], and I was a member of the editorial
team. I think I can tell you, not surprisingly—I expect you are going to
hear it today—this was a very contentious process. There were a number of
interests involved.
There were a lot of people on WG2 who were very pro-access. There
were others representing corporate interests that were concerned about
protecting secrets, and the like, that took an opposite view. It took four
years to get the Best Practices to the public version that is now available.
As I said, the process was contentious throughout.
What we did was to come up with a draft, and we did a series of “town
halls” around the country, five or six, inviting different constituencies to
come in and comment. It is fair to say that we have a couple of themes that
go through everything.
The first theme was a very basic distinction between discovery materials
that generally do not see the light of day and that people can protect as
much as they want under Rule 26(c)11 or the like and materials that are filed
in court. We were very much opposed to the concept of confidentiality
orders that included an automatic sealing provision such that, if parties
exchange discovery materials, they can simply—by filing an affidavit or
whatever—seal materials filed with the court. That is a First Amendment
violation.
I realize that there has always been a concern that we are driving people
out of the system because of transparency issues. We can debate that all
day, if we need to do that. But it is fair to say that Sedona came down very
much on the idea of open judicial proceedings, including jury selection,
openness in settlements, and openness in anything that may be filed with
the court. So we have the basic distinction between what goes on between
parties and what goes into courts.
We also came out very strongly on the concept of intervention. If there
are sealing orders filed, the public or the public is representative, which is
often the press, should have an opportunity to come in and challenge these
before a judge.
I am happy to say that we have been percolating along for three years
now. We are about to go online with another version of a database that
accumulates case law that has developed in the last several years, of which
there is an enormous amount. I see a trend of the future that we will see a
lot more issues created by electronic filings. For example, inadvertently
produced materials may be on the Internet that should not have been there
and how those materials are brought back.

10. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ (last visited Sept.
23, 2010).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
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In a nutshell, that is how The Sedona Conference put together the Best
Practices, what the Best Practices are intended to accomplish, and where the
Best Practices and WG2 may be in the course of the next several years.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Ron.
Peter Winn has been writing articles in this area for a number of years
now. He provided comments on the initial redaction rules that came
through. He has written an article dealing with some of the issues that the
subcommittee is investigating today. Peter Winn is an attorney for the
Department of Justice and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of
Washington Law School. Let me turn it over to Peter.
MR. WINN: Thank you very much.
I got into this business by accident several years ago when one of the
local judges in Seattle asked me to write an article about the privacy
implications of putting judicial records online.12 Over the next few years, I
became less and less happy with the analysis in that article and wrote
another that came out last year in the Federal Courts Law Review.13 I am
already starting to reconsider some of the arguments in that article.
I keep changing my mind because two things are going on here that are
very difficult to reconcile: we want court records and proceedings to be
open and transparent, but we also want to make sure that sensitive
information in the hands of the courts is protected. Both goals are
important. Transparency is necessary for the legitimacy of the system,
necessary to maintain a healthy political feedback loop, and necessary for
effective public oversight. However, at the same time, courts also have a
fundamental responsibility to engage in a truth-finding process. To find the
truth, courts need access to sensitive information from the participants in
the process—not only the litigants, but jurors and witnesses as well—
people who are critical for the fact-finding process to work. Traditionally,
these judicial participants have been more or less comfortable disclosing
their sensitive information with the understanding it would be used only for
purposes of resolving the dispute in the context of the judicial process and
would not come back to bite them. When participants start getting burned
or hurt after disclosing their sensitive information to the court—when the
information is used for other purposes than resolving the dispute—litigants,
witnesses, and jurors are going to be less and less inclined to tell the truth in
the first place. Thus, to make the system work we need both transparency
and privacy.
In the good old days of the paper-based system, we could have our cake
and eat it too. We could have both transparency and privacy because of the
practical obscurity of paper. Paper records were public, or at least ninetynine percent of them were public—the ones that were not filed under seal.
But because paper records were difficult to access, very few people were

12. Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004).
13. Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age: Old
Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135 (2009).
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ever hurt when sensitive information was filed in the so-called “public”
judicial system.
By contrast, electronic information is not practically obscure—its very
essence is to be easy to access. In this new world of electronic information,
we have become increasingly aware, sometimes shockingly aware, of just
how complicated and difficult it is to have both a transparent system and a
system that protects sensitive information. It was probably just as difficult
when people started to use paper in the thirteenth century, but we had 800
years to get used to it.
So where are we in the federal system? I like to think of the federal
system as a guinea pig, because it was out there first. That was probably
because we did not know any better—the benefits seemed obvious, the
costs hidden by the habits of centuries of using practically obscure paper.
The state courts have been the next wave and are struggling with the same
problems. I have learned much from watching the transition in the federal
system, but, in many ways, the state courts have much greater challenges.
Juvenile cases, divorce cases, probate cases, all present much more difficult
problems than those typically faced in the federal system.
In the federal system, to some extent, we have only jumped halfway into
the swimming pool. PACER is still not Google-searchable. It still has a lot
of the attributes of practical obscurity, simply because of the difficulty of
accessing the electronic information. I think it is almost certain that it is
going to be Google-searchable in ten years or sooner. It may be Googlesearchable much sooner than that. The law.gov movement, largely under
the leadership of Carl Malamud, is already in the process of seeing to it that
federal court records are online in a Google-searchable manner.14 It is just
in the nature of electronic information that it will become much more
accessible and will raise more and more difficult problems in the context of
protecting sensitive information.
So how do we protect sensitive information in courts? There are three
basic strategies.
One is not to put the information into the system in the first place.
Categories like Social Security numbers, names of minor children, financial
account numbers—a lot of times you simply do not need that information in
a pleading to start with—
JUDGE MORRIS: Excuse me, let me just interrupt. The word is called
bankruptcy.
MR. WINN: Right, bankruptcy.
JUDGE MORRIS: I will get there in a minute.
MR. WINN: I stand corrected. You do need to put quite a lot of
sensitive information in a bankruptcy file as a matter of law. So that
strategy does not work very well in bankruptcy. And more generally, that

14. LAW.GOV: A PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED REPOSITORY OF ALL PRIMARY LEGAL
MATERIALS OF THE UNITED STATES, http://public.resource.org/law.gov (last visited Sept. 23,
2010).
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strategy will not work when sensitive information needs to be filed with the
court.
A second strategy is to try to put it in the judicial system either under
seal, or offline. The 2007 privacy rules permit the use of protective orders
to take documents or information offline—similar to how Social Security
and immigration cases are routinely handled today. This strategy has not
yet widely been adopted by lawyers. Instead, agreed sealing orders are still
the norm. However, while reliable to protect sensitive information, agreed
sealing orders often fail to meet the required common law and
constitutional standard—a standard seldom enforced in the absence of a
dispute. As electronic court records become increasingly subject to
computerized audits, and as the improper use by attorneys of the agreed
sealing order to protect sensitive information becomes subject to greater
legal scrutiny, the agreed sealing order, itself, may become a thing of the
past. If that happens, using protective orders to take sensitive information
offline may become the only practical alternative.
The third idea to protect sensitive information was just raised by
Professor Joel Reidenberg. That is, to prevent people from using sensitive
information filed in court records for secondary uses unrelated to the
administration of justice. A general rule permitting disclosure of certain
information in the context of the public court proceeding but prohibiting
disclosure of the same information outside the courthouse would probably
be unconstitutional. In my article in the Federal Courts Law Review,15
however, I suggested that a more limited set of information management
requirements, unrelated to any specific content, and imposed solely on bulk
data aggregators might pass constitutional muster. Data aggregators might
be required by contract to adhere to certain information management
procedures in exchange for the grant of bulk access privileges. Thus, for
instance, they might be required to “scrub” their data for inadvertently filed
Social Security numbers (as many of them do now anyway). However,
with the exception of limited computer “scrubbing” techniques, I have
grave doubts that general rules to address the more difficult problem of
secondary use of information from court files—for instance, “data mining”
judicial information for commercial purposes—will ever be likely either to
pass constitutional muster or be very effective as a practical matter at
protecting sensitive information. In conclusion, I do not see any obvious,
easy, one-size-fits-all solution.
I do have some hope that we will be able to muddle through and find
solutions to these problems, but I do not think it will be easy, or that the
solutions will be found quickly. We have three basic tools available: rules,
training, and technology. I think the rules that the federal courts have
developed are reasonably good. I am just not sure that there is much more
you can do in the rulemaking process. You cannot have a general rule
forbidding the filing of all sensitive information—much of that information
must be part of the public court record, and what is sensitive in some
15. See Winn, supra note 13.
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contexts is not sensitive in others. The courts have to rely on the parties
and their attorneys to identify the sensitive information in their filings and
take affirmative steps to protect it. That is pretty much all the rules do now,
and pretty much what any rules in the future would ever be able to do.
The more significant area of deficiency—that is, the area where there is
most room for improvement—is the need for better training of lawyers.
Most of us have developed our intuitions in a paper-based world of
practical obscurity. We have taken it for granted that documents filed with
the clerk’s office will stay in the court system and will not surprise us with
unexpected secondary uses. Many older lawyers still have their secretaries
file their pleadings on the PACER system, and lack any real personal
knowledge of the system. The younger generation is much more
technologically literate, but we can all do with better training. It may not be
until our children’s generation is practicing law that lawyers will become
better attuned to the problems of handling judicial information properly,
given the wider and more open set of possibilities for its secondary use.
We, who have been trained in a particular way, will simply have to die and
let somebody else take over.
The area with potentially the most promise is the improvement offered by
better technology. We can do a much better job facilitating access. Court
decisions, briefs ought to be Google-searchable. We can do a much better
job than we are doing protecting sensitive information in the process, and
technology is an important part of that solution. Professor Edward Felten
has highlighted many of these potential solutions. These technological
solutions are possible only if lawyers and judges begin to work proactively
with computer programmers. We tend to assume that computer technology
is a given when we engage in rulemaking or when we plan our CLE
programs. It is not. The problems that we fashion rules to try to address,
and that we train lawyers to better understand, are in part, creatures of a
particular form of technology. The design of that technology can be
changed to solve some of these problems. However, these technological
changes often spawn new problems, making new rules and training
necessary. It is an endless cycle, but that is no reason to give up.
As we struggle with these problems in the federal system, much can be
learned from watching our sister courts in the state system navigate these
electronic rapids. State courts have much larger dockets, and often manage
much more sensitive information than do the federal courts—one need only
think of the type of information handled by family courts and in juvenile
criminal proceedings to see just how difficult these challenges are. One
lesson that appears to have been learned by both the state and the federal
courts is the importance of involving as diverse as possible group of
interested parties in the development of both the rules and the technology
which will be used as courts go online. At the Williamsburg conferences
where state and federal court personnel meet to explore different ideas,16
16. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsconline.org/
images/NCSC_GeneralBrocWEB.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
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there appears to be a consensus that it is critical to get everybody to the
table when you are making decisions. The process is similar to that
involved in drafting an environmental-impact-statement. When all the
affected players are at the table, the conversation can be contentious.
However, it makes it more likely you will identify the problems at the front
end, when it is still possible to hash out some solutions. Furthermore, it
makes it more likely that the proposed solutions you reach will be more
likely to work, with greater buy-in by participants in the end. It is nearly
impossible to identify the problems of managing sensitive information
when you try to think these things through in the abstract. You have to get
everybody at the table and explore the problems before you can identify
solutions.
Finally, a related point I would like to make is that sensitive information
is largely a matter of context. Information is not sensitive simply because it
jumps out at us that it needs protection. It all depends. Information can be
sensitive in some contexts and not in others. For instance, information
excluded by the application of the Rules of Evidence is not sensitive if
disclosed to the public; but it is very sensitive if disclosed to the jury. Thus,
a motion to suppress can be filed and disclosed to the public subject to the
classic judicial oversight concepts. However, if a juror uses the PACER
system to learn about the cocaine seized by an illegal government search or
a defendant’s prior criminal record—information which may be public and
online—we may no longer be able to provide the defendant a fair trial,
consistent with fundamental notions of due process.
In the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham argued against the
exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that jurors should be trusted to
make decisions after hearing all the facts.17 As electronic information
becomes more and more difficult to control, we may be forced to adopt
Bentham’s view of the exclusionary rules. However, I believe and hope
that we all can focus on this problem and get a handle on it. I think we have
to get a handle on it. But I really do not have any obvious, easy solutions
about how to do it, other than to try to muddle through, and continue to
work together.
Thank you.
PROF. CAPRA: Thanks, Peter.
Our next speaker is Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press.
MS. DALGLISH: Thank you. Good morning. It is nice to be here.
The Reporters Committee, for those of you who do not know, is a legal
defense and advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C.18 We have
been around for forty years. We help journalists defend themselves when
they are in trouble and gain access to all sorts of state and federal records
and proceedings. I have one entire program area, run by a super-fellow, an
17. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 15–16 (1827).
18. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org (last
visited Sept. 23, 2010).
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experienced litigator who has spent a year with us, and they are focused
solely in the area of secret courts and prior restraints. This is of great
interest to me. I am a former journalist and a former litigator. All of my
lawyers are former reporters.
I need you to understand a little bit about the landscape that journalism is
operating in right now. Whereas all of the rest of you are probably going,
“Oh, my God, the Internet. Everything’s available,” reporters are going,
“Oh, my God, the Internet. Everything’s available. Suddenly I might
actually be able to do my job effectively.”
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in
mainstream news organizations. By having easy access to this information,
they are able to do a better job of reporting the news to the public. There
are some jurisdictions—probably not Manhattan, but certainly in places like
Utah—where you have many local newspapers and really only one federal
court that covers an enormous geographic area. Now they are able to
accurately and completely report news stories as well. We view the
PACER system as miraculous. It by and large works very, very well. I
work on cases all across the country, and I love it, because I no longer have
to rely on a local lawyer to go and dig out some information about a case I
have heard about.
There are, as I said, fewer reporters. Many of them who were able to
support a family on a journalism income in the past are no longer able to do
that, so you have a lot more independent journalists. Money is an obstacle
to PACER. A lot of them just cannot even afford to use it anymore.
I want to break my comments, very briefly, down into several categories.
One, I would like to talk about the identifiers issue. I would like to talk
briefly about plea agreements. I would like to talk very briefly about
settlement agreements, the trend toward anonymous juries, and then the
most important problem of all, which really was not even on the agenda, the
issue of disappearing cases in the federal docket system.
First of all, identifier issues. I was one of the folks who testified back in
2002 or when you came up with the first rules. By and large, I think the
redaction system that you have implemented that allows the last four digits
of bank account numbers and Social Security numbers works fairly well. It
does not cause a lot of phone calls from reporters. They are not all that
concerned about it.
One thing that is a problem, however, is the birth date issue. Reporters’
issues have to do almost exclusively with making sure they have the right
person. I come from the land of Johnsons, Andersons, Sorensons, and
Carlsons. And there are not just hundreds of them; there are thousands of
them. You need to make sure that you have the right John Anderson.
Reporters do not want to identify the wrong John Anderson as a criminal.
They want to be accurate. Often the best way to ensure you have the right
John Anderson is to know the birth date of the person who has been
charged with a crime. Perhaps even worse than having personal identifying
information released about someone actually involved in a court case is
when information is released and everybody thinks it is about the wrong
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guy. That is a real problem, and the more information you can provide,
particularly a birth date, helps reporters identify the right person.
If you do not need all the rest of this stuff—I understand bankruptcy is an
exception—if you do not need it, why are you collecting it? I think you
really need to think very carefully about the identifying information that
you do collect in the federal court files.
Plea agreements are something that reporters traditionally have relied
upon—not every day, but sometimes there is very useful information that
appears in those cases. It is helpful to flesh out a story, to identify trends.
Lately, with the reporters who are calling me and asking me, “Why can’t I
get this plea agreement information?” it has to do with business cases,
where they are trying to figure out who in Enron or who in whatever other
criminal economic case they have is talking to whom. That information is
very useful.
One of the problems that I hear is from reporters who work for the
national publications and national broadcast stations. You guys have rules
that are different all over the country. I have one summer intern coming in
this summer who is going to work on just keeping track of what the feds are
doing with plea agreements, because we need to be able to tell reporters
what they can get and what they cannot get in each district.
There is, in my mind, an appalling trend toward completely anonymous
juries in the federal system and the state system as well. I understand that
we are asking people to give up a lot when they become a juror. But you
know what? That is something that, when you are an American citizen, you
just sign up for. We have a responsibility to serve on juries. I think the
notion that you cannot find out who jurors are in the federal system, unless
you are really, really lucky or you file requests for it months and months
after a case is resolved or you are lucky enough to sit through a trial, to find
out who is sitting on that jury panel—I think it is appalling. I think a
criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial, and part of that is having the
ability for the public to know whether or not the people who were
empanelled on that jury should have been empanelled on that jury.
The best case I can think of about this—and it was not a federal case, but
I think it illustrates my point—there was a murder case being tried in New
Jersey. It resulted in a mistrial. The Philadelphia Inquirer did a story about
what was going on in this entire case. 19 They were the ones that figured
out that the jury foreman did not even live in New Jersey. She was from
Pennsylvania. She had apparently had a car licensed in New Jersey. She
got elected to be the jury foreman in this murder trial. That is just
appalling. And it was a reporter who figured that out.
When you came up with the electronic court access rules, this completely
slipped right by us. It was not until probably six months afterwards that
reporters were calling saying, “What is going on? All of a sudden we

19. Rita Giordano, Post-Neulander Trial Contempt Case Near End, PHILA. INQUIRER,
May 24, 2002, at B3.
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cannot find out who is sitting on a federal jury unless we are actually sitting
there and we might overhear a name.”
It turned out that this was part of the electronic access rules that
completely slipped by us. You would have heard from us if I had been
paying better attention way back when.
Settlement agreements—I think Ron is going to talk more about all of
this. There is some very important information that can be accessed. It is
of great public benefit. Probably the best example—and perhaps Dave
McCraw can talk about this a little bit more from The New York Times
Company standpoint—The Boston Globe—again, I think these were mostly
state court cases—found out a great deal of information from their Pulitzer
Prize-winning stories on priest abuse in the Archdiocese of Boston.20 Most
of that information came after they were able to go back twenty, thirty,
forty years and get a lot of those settlement agreements unsealed. I think
when the safety of children is involved, there is no reason whatsoever why
all of these things need to be sealed. It is a public safety issue.
Finally, the secret docket cases. I never in a million years would have
thought this would be possible. We have a system of open courts in this
country. I understand that in certain circumstances when you are
conducting a criminal investigation and you have not completed all of the
indictments in your case that you are trying to present and you are trying to
get all your ducks in a row and get people charged in the right order, maybe
it has to be temporarily sealed. But right now, as far as I can tell, there is
not a single district in this country who has figured out how to reopen those
completely secret cases once they have been closed.
What usually happens is a U.S. Attorney will come in and say, “We just
caught this really bad guy,” and you will go in and try to find the case—this
is not in every district, but in a fair number of them—and it does not exist.
You go to the clerk of court and they say, “We cannot open it unless we
have a court order.” You go to the judge and he says, “I cannot unseal it
unless the U.S. Attorney tells me I can.” And you go to the U.S. Attorney
and they say, “Well, that is a problem that the judge is supposed to come up
with.”
Meanwhile, at one point several years ago, we found thousands of cases
in the federal system where docket numbers were just missing. Now, I
know the Judicial Conference has attempted to address this issue, but it has
not been fixed yet.
My very last point is on the civil side. There was a case we got involved
in about a year ago, involving a federal civil case that was conducted
entirely in secret in Pennsylvania for seven years. It was a situation where a
woman brought a claim under the federal anti-pregnancy discrimination
law.21 She sued her former employer, who, she contended, fired her

20. Predator
Priests,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
http://www.boston.com/globe/
spotlight/abuse/predators/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
21. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming
the district court’s order to seal the case).
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because she had an abortion. This thing was litigated for seven years. The
only way we found out about it was when it was appealed to the Third
Circuit and the Third Circuit decision was released and the local legal
newspaper said, “What is this?” They went back to get the documents, and
the entire case was sealed.
That is just plain not right.
PROF. CAPRA: Thanks, Lucy.
I will say there are people in this room who are on the case of some of
the issues that Lucy was dealing with, particularly disappearing docket
numbers, entirely sealed cases. That report, to my understanding, is
forthcoming.
So there has been significant work done on that. The Privacy
Subcommittee and the Sealing Subcommittee have been kind of working in
tandem on these issues, because the issues do tend to overlap in some
respects.
But thanks for bringing that up. That is an issue that the Judicial
Conference is working on.
You have already heard the fact that some of these issues are much more
difficult in bankruptcy than anywhere else. We will see when Joe Cecil
presents his data that many of the unredacted Social Security numbers that
have been found in the two-month search that Joe did were in bankruptcy
proceedings. So we thought it appropriate in terms of setting the table for
the rest of the day to bring in an expert on these matters. That is Judge
Cecelia Morris, who is from the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy
Court and also served as the clerk of that court for many years.
I turn the floor over to Judge Morris.
JUDGE MORRIS: Okay, everybody, get a pen and paper out right now
and number from one to five. I am serious. Do it. I was given this idea by
Karen Gross, the president of Southern Vermont College since 2006.
I want you to write down five entities that you owe money to. Do it.
This is a serious test. Besides writing down who you owe money to, write
down how much you owe them. And do not tell me you do not have any
debt. If you have a phone in your pocket, you have debt, because they give
it to you on credit. They give you electricity on credit. So you have debt.
While you are doing this, I want your full name, every name you have
been known under, and your Social Security number. Your monthly
mortgage payments, your cable bill, your insurance premiums. Keep
writing. I see people not writing.
I want the ages of your minor children. Are you getting there?
Now, beginning right here, I want you to come up to this podium and
read everything you have just written to this room.
That is how it feels to file bankruptcy.
Privacy is important. Last year the consumer cases skyrocketed, and 1.3
million entities filed bankruptcy, most of those filings were individuals that
had to do exactly what you did. And, by the way, we are putting it on the
Internet.
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MS. DALGLISH: Full Social Security numbers are going on the
Internet?
JUDGE MORRIS: No, full Social Security numbers are no longer going
on the Internet. But that is what you are doing, and we are sending your
full Social Security numbers to your creditors. They are not going on the
Internet.
By the way, we are also putting this information on PACER at an
incredibly low price. The idea that you cannot afford to go on PACER at
how much a page? That is sort of beyond me.
There is a difference here also between the number of cases filed in
federal district court of about 300,000 and the 1.3 million cases filed in
bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy, as we have already heard, more than any
other area of law, has a pronounced dichotomy between the debtor’s
privacy rights and the rights of creditors and the public to this information.
Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code states that information filed in the
bankruptcy court is “public records and open to examination by an entity at
reasonable times without charge.”22 That is what it says.
The press may want the birth date. My financial world wants my Social
Security number. In 1995, when CM/ECF23 went live, I did not even know
my Social Security number. Why did I not know it? I did not have to have
it for every credit card, for every financial transaction. Today it is
memorized. Why? Because it is part of every financial transaction.
So I am filing bankruptcy. What do I need? I need my name, address,
birth date, familial situation. Am I married? How many kids do I have?
What are their ages? Employer, current income, assets, including real
property, jewelry, household goods, liabilities, current rent, mortgage
payment, taxes, club fees, medical expenses, tuition payments, charitable
donations, creditors, judgment, liens, leases, security deposits, IRAs, and all
other retirement accounts. Each of those entities that I owe money to needs
correct information in order to prosecute their claim. Your credit life is
now tracked through your Social Security number.
The bankruptcy electronic filing system is vital to the practitioners, the
creditors, the judges that participate in the bankruptcy system. It also
greatly expands the number of individuals who can easily access the
information. The debtor and the creditors and the public all benefit from
the thorough disclosure of information. My name is Cecelia Morris. I do
not want to be confused with the Cecelia Morris that filed bankruptcy in
Brooklyn. It is similar in this way to the no-fly list that unless you have
another identifier to distinguish Cecelia Morris in Poughkeepsie and
Cecelia Morris in Brooklyn, it would mess up my credit report.
In response to privacy concerns, we have all heard about the December
2003 rules that allow only the disclosure of the last four digits of a Social
Security number on the publicly available bankruptcy petition. You still
22. 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
23. CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) is the case management and
electronic case files system for most United States federal courts.
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have to file the Social Security number, because your creditors are entitled
to the full Social Security number. It is only the public information and the
public docket that redacts everything except the last four digits. Again, you
want to make sure the right parties and interests have the right notice, the
proper notice, and are necessarily at the meeting of creditors.
When I described to you about coming up here and talking, that is the
meeting of creditors. The meeting of creditors is run by a trustee. “Raise
your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that everything you have told me
on this petition is true and correct? Does anyone have a question?”
Under this new system, most of the account numbers are redacted,
including bank accounts, credit cards, loans. When a case is filed pro se,
the court makes every effort to protect private information since pro se
debtors will often fail to redact confidential information. There is good
quality control in the bankruptcy court clerk’s office. There is really very
good quality control on the petition filed by attorneys. The lawyers know
how to do it. It gets done. The pro ses hand it in physically—remember,
the electronic case filing system in the bankruptcy court is made for
lawyers. It is not made for pro ses. Pro ses still have to come to the court.
The last thing that happened to me in the courtroom that was just blatant
was when a lawyer had filed a petition with the wrong Social Security
number and, in filing with the wrong Social Security number, she then filed
a motion that said that was the wrong Social Security number and this is the
correct one. The motion had the full Social Security number. Needless to
say, she was chastised in court. She also fired a staffer. I am sure that was
not the only thing the staffer had done, but that incident underscores the
importance of maintaining a high level of discipline when it comes to
redacting information.
Now let’s talk about creditors.
Everybody is familiar with the Bernie Madoff case. Does anyone in the
room not know about Bernie Madoff and the Ponzi scheme? Guess what
happened? All of the proofs of claims have attachments. What did they do
with the attachments, these creditors? They scanned those—Social Security
numbers, home addresses, investment account numbers. Some of these
people are worth a lot of money. With their Social Security numbers, you
can go down to the bankruptcy court or sit at home on your computer, and
you can find out a lot of information.
If I had to identify the greatest source of unredacted information, I would
point to proofs of claims filed by pro se creditors. Not all creditors are
large banks with legal counsel; many creditors are small businesses or
individuals who will attempt to fill out a proof of claim themselves. As in
the Madoff case, they will attach all sorts of identifying information about
both the debtor and themselves. Compounding this problem is that these
proofs of claim, unlike the bankruptcy petition itself, is not quality
controlled by the bankruptcy clerk’s office.
With respect to pro se debtors and pro se creditors, it is clear that they do
not know why it is so important to redact identifying information. The
court and the official forms may be able to do a better job at clarifying why
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things need to be redacted, to prevent identity theft, and how to redact
information, block it out. Clear, unequivocal instructions such as, “Do not
give us your full Social Security Number in this proof of claim.”
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Judge.
As Judge Raggi pointed out in her introduction, a historical kind of
framework for this is going to be very valuable for the committee. We
could not get anybody better on that particular task than Professor Maeva
Marcus. I would like to turn it over to her. She is a Research Professor of
Law and Director of the Institute for Constitutional History at George
Washington University Law School.
PROF. MARCUS: Thank you.
After reading the summaries of what will be discussed today, and after
hearing my fellow panelists, I realize that historians’ concerns are
somewhat different from the problems on the conference agenda. We take
the long view: we want court papers to be saved exactly as they were filed
and to be accessible in the future, because they are a fruitful source for all
kinds of historical research.
Since the beginning of the national
government in 1789, the operations of the federal judiciary have played a
significant role in the development of the nation, and no one today can
anticipate what particular topic will be of interest to scholars in the coming
decades. It is impossible to determine what will be relevant and important
to the questions that will be studied fifty or a hundred years from now.
Historians, therefore, do not want records to be changed in any way or
destroyed.
They also do not want records to be sealed. I do not have firsthand
experience with case papers that have been sealed. I do know, however,
that papers are sealed too frequently, and litigation has ensued. If these
papers are not eventually opened, who knows what will have been lost to
history. Historians would urge the privacy subcommittee to devote the time
and energy to finding technological solutions to practical problems like the
redacting of information that would identify individuals or making voir dire
transcripts public, so that scholars can have access to as many court papers
as possible in the future. I understand that there are instances in which
sealing the record, or part of it, is the only feasible solution at the moment.
I would encourage the subcommittee to consider time limits for sealed
papers.
Time limits have been used in a variety of situations where privacy is a
concern. Judges who leave their papers to public repositories, for example,
often provide in the deeds of gift that the collections cannot be used for a
specified length of time. We assume, especially when the time limit is
stated as “after all judges who served with the subject have left the bench,”
that the concern is to spare embarrassment for the judge’s colleagues. But
often a judge’s papers contain items such as information about litigants that
raise privacy concerns. Historians sometimes find copies of court filings in
these collections, and these papers do not necessarily have the redactions
that you find in the official copies of the documents. And this is a good
thing for us. The very items of information that are redacted are often
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useful to scholarly studies. While the judge and parties might not want this
information disseminated at the time the case is being considered by the
court, we would like it to be preserved. Historians believe that primary
sources should be kept just as they originated. No changes should be made
by another hand. If a time limit is imposed on sealed court records or
redactions, I think that privacy concerns would dissipate.
As illustration of historians’ need for unadulterated court papers, I can
point to a number of very important books whose authors have used federal
court records as their primary sources. Most of these concern courts in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau produced
the only monograph dealing with a federal district court in the 1790s, an indepth study of the court in Kentucky that served by law as both district and
circuit court.24 My own work on The Documentary History of the Supreme
Court of the United States25 required many visits to regional archives to
find the lower federal court records that would reveal how and why the case
was brought to the Supreme Court.
For the nineteenth century, Christian Fritz’s book, Federal Justice in
California: The Court of Ogden Hoffman, 1851–1891, is a perfect
example.26 This monograph illustrates a new trend in judicial history.
Formerly, and still today to a large extent, our conclusions about the role of
courts and judges in our society were based on appellate opinions. But a
thorough study of a particular district court provides a view of the operation
of law that had not been available to us previously. We learn about all
kinds of judicial business that did not eventuate in appellate court decisions.
The great variety of litigation, the people involved in it—and the trial court
involves the largest number of people in the federal system—all inform the
legal, economic, and social history of the period being studied. For an
accurate picture to be drawn, records cannot be tampered with. Nothing has
been removed from the eighteenth and nineteenth century records used in
these works. If information is removed from twenty-first century court
records, historians will not be able to produce equally valid studies.
Some authors who have tackled twentieth century topics that required
research in federal court records have found the court records useful but had
to supply information that had been redacted from them. Often, this
information was found in copies of these court documents in private
collections. Examples include Allen Weinstein’s book, Perjury: The HissChambers Case27 and Stanley Kutler’s work, The American Inquisition:
Justice and Injustice in the Cold War.28

24. MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY
1789–1816 (1978).
25. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 8 vols., 1985–2007).
26. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA: THE COURT OF OGDEN
HOFFMAN, 1851–1891 (1991).
27. ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE (1978).
28. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE
COLD WAR (1982).
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Writing history has changed a little bit in the twenty-first century. For
example, a book on Bush v. Gore29 came out sooner than it would have in
the twentieth century, because all the Florida court records were on the
Internet, and the author was able to do research in those records quickly.
I have addressed myself to the privacy concerns with which this
conference is concerned. Let me just say in conclusion that there is a larger
question in the minds of historians, and that is the condition of the
permanent records and where they will be found in the future. Everyone
seems to be talking about instant access online. Will the courts continue to
administer the electronic database or will electronic records be turned over
to the National Archives, as the law requires?
The records of federal executive agencies—and lower federal courts are
treated as agencies by the statute—are to be turned over to the National
Archives, and it is the National Archives’ responsibility to decide which
records should be kept permanently. When space for paper records was an
issue, there were fights over the destruction of records by the National
Archives, and court records often were involved.
About thirty years ago, for example, the National Archives decided to
keep all bankruptcy records from the nineteenth century but to destroy a
large portion of the twentieth century records because there were too many
of them. In the early 1980s, Chief Judge of the Northern District of
California Robert Peckham and a group of historians began a campaign to
encourage the National Archives to rescind its decision. They were
partially successful. The Archives agreed with the historians on a sampling
plan that would preserve a sufficient number of twentieth century
bankruptcy records to enable economic, social, and historical analyses to
proceed. But I gather that this sampling may not yet be in place.
A similar problem has befallen the records of other federal courts. The
National Archives put on hold its most recent records schedule, because of
opposition to the plan to destroy a large number of court records. The
Archives agreed to do an assessment, but that has not been completed.
Historians face many obstacles to using court records in their research.
Even before the advent of electronic records, courts were derelict in sending
their papers to the Archives. We expect to find court records in regional
archives, but often they just are not there. Working in the 1980s, David
Frederick, who wrote a history of the Ninth Circuit from 1891 to 1941,30
found no records in the Archives but, after searching the courthouse, found
some relevant material in the clerk’s office. When I was working on my
Steel Seizure book31 in the 1970s, I, too, looked for records at the Archives
but ended up finding them at the D.C. courthouse where the steel
companies filed suit. When you are lucky enough to find that a court
29. CHARLES L. ZELDEN, BUSH V. GORE: EXPOSING THE HIDDEN CRISIS IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2008).
30. DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE AMERICAN WEST, 1891–1941 (1994).
31. MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
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actually has sent its records to the regional archives, you are faced with a
warehouse of records and no good way to search for exactly what you
would like to see. Electronic records represent an advance, because they, at
least, are searchable. Are they permanent, however? And historians have
found that the National Archives’ own database is difficult to use and
behind the times, so sending records there may not be the best thing for
historians, though the law has not changed.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you.
First, I want to ask Ron Hedges about the sealing issues. Just being
involved anecdotally in cases, I see that it is kind of automatic that lawyers
file things under seal. Is there something that needs to be done about this?
MR. HEDGES: I do not think it is automatic that lawyers file things
under seal. I think it is automatic that lawyers sign protective orders that
have provisions in them that really govern discovery, and some place in that
protective order there is a sealing provision.
PROF. CAPRA: But in REFCO,32 we had filings just filed under seal
automatically, when they did not have any confidential information in them
that we could see. Does that happen routinely, in people’s experience?
MR. HEDGES: I think, depending on the nature of the litigation, yes. I
supervised a lot of IP litigation, and it is common in patent litigation and the
like to want to protect information because someone thinks there is a
commercial secret somewhere that cannot see the light of day. The fact of
the matter is, there are not many things in civil litigation that need to be
filed under seal.
PROF. CAPRA: On the issue of anonymous juries, I do not know, Lucy,
what the reference was to the electronic access stuff that you let go by, but
there is nothing in the rules that I know about that deals with anonymous
juries—in the privacy rules.
MS. DALGLISH: My understanding is, it says, while the case is
pending, you cannot get it, and afterwards you can go back and make an
application. Then, when the entire case is concluded somewhere down the
line, you might be able to go back and do it.
PROF. CAPRA: That is not one of the Judicial Conference’s rules, in
my understanding. Is it?
MS. DALGLISH: I was told that it happened at the same time as the
electronic court access rules.
PROF. CAPRA: I just think that it is a case-by-case approach. Am I
wrong, Judge?
MS. DALGLISH: No, it is not case-by-case.
PROF. CAPRA: In terms of what CACM has on this, is there anything
on anonymous juries?
MS. DALGLISH: In other words, if I am a reporter, I can go to any
federal court in the country while the jury is being selected and they have

32. In re REFCO Sec. Litig., No. 07 MDL 1902(JSR), 2010 WL 304966 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
21, 2010).
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just been empanelled, and I can go to the clerk of court’s office and say,
“Can you tell me the names of the individuals on this jury?” I am not aware
of a single U.S. district court in this country that would let you have it while
the case is going on.
PROF. CAPRA: I am just inquiring as to where this doctrine comes
from. Judge Huff wants to speak.
JUDGE HUFF: Isn’t there a ninety-day hold on filing transcripts to
permit the redaction process to occur?
JUDGE TUNHEIM: There is, and transcripts of juror voir dire are
generally set aside separately.
PROF. CAPRA: This is not an anonymous jury rule per se. We are
talking, really, about the transcripts, which leads us to the panel.
MS. DALGLISH: If you go and listen in court and attempt to catch their
name, you can hear their name. If you have missed jury selection and you
want to go in to the clerk’s office and say, “Can I have a list of the folks
who were empanelled?” they will tell you no. I am telling you, this is going
on all over the country. I get about three phone calls a month.
JUDGE TUNHEIM: I am not aware of any rule or policy that affects
that. You are probably right. In most instances, it depends on what the
clerk’s office will turn over to you. I think technically that should be
available. But it is not the subject of any rule or policy that I am aware of.
PROF. CAPRA: Mr. Hedges?
MR. HEDGES: The big debate going on these days now is in large
trials, where there are extensive juror voir dires being done and there are
pre-questionnaires being sent out. A question that courts are facing is
whether or not those questionnaires are things that should be available,
especially now that a number are being offered electronically.
The anonymous juries that I have seen are really ad hoc events because
of concerns, generally, about organized crime. The last time the Second
Circuit really had a fight about that was the Martha Stewart trial four or five
years ago.
PROF. CAPRA: In which the Second Circuit said that the judge had
acted too broadly.
MR. HEDGES: That is right.
JUDGE RAGGI: I am sure we are going to discuss this more. I think
what you are talking about is what judges would not consider to be an
anonymous jury.
MS. DALGLISH: You are right. I misspoke.
JUDGE RAGGI: Just so we are all talking about the same thing.
Because, as you yourself pointed out, the profession of journalism has
changed so much. A person who comes to the clerk’s office and says,
“Could I have the names and addresses of the jury?” could be looking to do
investigative reporting or could be up to mischief. No clerk is probably just
going to turn it over without making sure the judge wants it. So in the end,
that query is going to probably go to a judge, and then you are going to talk
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to a judge about why you want it and whether he is going to give it to you
or not.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you.
I want to give Professor Reidenberg a chance to kind of sum up on this
issue of limited usage. Then we will close and get to the next panel.
PROF. REIDENBERG: Thanks, Dan.
I think it is really a question of thinking about the disclosure and the uses
that we associate with public access to the courts as really being part of our
political checks and balances. What are some of the uses? Oversight of
court fairness, oversight of court administration, uses connected with the
litigation—that is the bankruptcy case.
But now, when we talk about secrecy of the identity of jurors during a
trial and the points you just raised, we get into other areas where we must
be far more careful. Is it okay, for example, that someone wants the names
and addresses of jurors who are sitting on the jury because they want to sell
them a particular cell phone service? Suppose the cell company’s
marketers discover that jurors, while they are sitting on juries, tend to be
more susceptible to advertisements for text plans. Is that the kind of world
that we want to see? I am very unsympathetic toward those types of
releases.
What about someone who wants to gain access to information from
probate records to create lists for a dating service of widows and widowers
who happen to be wealthy?
If we start seeing too much secondary use or out of context use, if we
start putting voir dire questionnaires in real time, online, in ways that are
searchable from Bing, what will be the effect on the willingness of our
citizens to participate in our legal system?
PROF. CAPRA: Is the technology available to limit that kind of
motivational use?
PROF. REIDENBERG: Yes. We can build the architectures. But, we
also need to build a legal structure that has some kind of sanction for the
non-permissible uses.

